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Introduction: Sex Purchase Bans In Norway and Sweden  
 
As of January 2009, the purchase of sexual services is legally prohibited in 
Norway (and, for Norwegian citizens, abroad). Thus, after Sweden, which passed 
a similar bill in 1998, Norway became the second country in the world to 
criminalise buying, but not selling, sexual services. Why did Norway and Sweden 
adopt their respective sex purchase bans? Some scholars and commentators have 
argued that Norway followed in the footsteps of Sweden largely because of the 
lobbying of a broad feminist movement, which succeeded in construing 
prostitution as violence against women.1 However, the sex purchase ban has been 
on the agenda for decades in Norway, gathering a broad, makeshift coalition of 
feminists, Christian groups and centrist politicians, which rather raises the 
question why they achieved the necessary parliamentary support only in 2007. 
Drawing on a broad range of constructivist and ideational literature in both 
international relations and comparative politics, we examine both cases in detail. 
For Norway, we argue that the decisive shift came as a response to public outrage 
in mass media over the sudden arrival of Nigerian prostitutes selling sex in the 
Karl Johan street in downtown Oslo and other cities in 2003-2004. Key actors 
drew upon this development and came out in favour of criminalising the purchase 
of sexual services, where arguments construing the problem as transnational 
trafficking won out against competing problem frames. Politicians did not always 
present the sex purchase ban as a solution to that problem, yet it provided the 
backdrop for policy entrepreneurs to discover an increasingly receptive 
environment for calls to criminalise the purchase of sexual services (CPSS). In the 
process, the sex purchase ban was re-crafted as a solution to the problems of 
organised, cross-border trafficking.  Following this, we turn back the clock and 
examine the Swedish case.  There, we argue that CPSS resulted chiefly from the 
successful deployment of gender equality ideas in conjunction with causal stories 
as to the histories of abuse suffered by female prostitutes.  While ban opponents 
                                                                    
1 Strøm, “A glimpse into 30 years of struggle against prostitution by the women's liberation 
movement in Norway.” 
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raised concerns as to whether CPSS could have the desired effect, such concerns 
were ultimately unpersuasive when faced with the growing belief among many 
political elites that high profile policies promoting gender equality needed to be 
integrated into the mainstream of Swedish policymaking.2 Thus, while ideas are 
an important tool for achieving policy change, different ideas are necessary in 
different national contexts, even when agents seek similar policy outcomes. 
First though, we position our own, ideational approach to prostitution policy 
change in relation to alternative explanations, which either focus on how strategic 
actors deploy power resources in order to further their goals, or on how the 
problem of prostitution is construed in public discourses.  This will set the stage 
for our subsequent discussion of prostitution policy reform in Norway and 
Sweden. 
EXPLAINING PROSTITUTION POLICY CHANGE 
Over the past decades, prostitution policies in Europe have been subject to 
dramatic change, but not convergence. As scholars have sought to explain this 
policy variance, they have tended either to focus on the agents pushing for 
prostitution policy change, or on the policy discourses in terms of which 
prostitution is construed as a societal phenomenon. This theoretical division of 
labour is also mirrored in the few studies that have addressed the case of 
Norway’s recent prostitution policy shift. 
The first category of research explains policy change as a process driven by 
rational actors seeking to further their self-interest: “policy outcomes are 
determined by negotiations between powerful actors, each trying to advance its 
agenda.”3 This so-called power-interest model partially overlaps with a certain 
line of feminist research on the so-called critical mass thesis, which starts from the 
assumption that mobilising and representing women politically is crucial for 
                                                                    
2 Dodillet, “Cultural clash on prostitution: Debates on prostitution in Germany and Sweden in the 
1990s”; Dodillet, “Ideologiska förutsättningar för den svenska och den tyska 
prostitutionslagstiftningen”; Dodillet, A!r sex arbete? : svensk och tysk prostitutionspolitik sedan 
1970-talet. 
3 Bleich, “Integrating Ideas into Policy-Making Analysis: Frames and Race Policies in Britain and 
France.” 
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achieving women-friendly policies.4 In the context of prostitution policy reform, 
some feminist scholars, activists and policymakers have attributed the adoption of 
sex purchase bans in Sweden (and subsequently) Norway to “feminists and 
dedicated female politicians [who] understood the importance of and fought for 
the right of all women to have full control of their bodies.”5 Such studies usually 
tell linear narratives of success, where the strategic action and coalition building 
efforts by a “velvet triangle” of feminist activists, politicians and academics result 
in a series of women-friendly policies. 
While this explanatory model usefully draws our attention to the interplay 
among political actors, it is insufficient as an account of prostitution policy 
change. First, a general problem with the power-interest model and the associated 
critical mass thesis in feminist scholarship is that they tend to take interests for 
granted. But the real puzzle is often to explain why certain actors define their 
policy preferences in the first place, and why similarly situated actors in different 
national contexts often come to take such different stance. Especially, second, 
another line of feminist scholarship questions the very notion that women as such 
share certain interests which get translated into policy once they gain sufficient 
political standing. Gender, these critics argue, is not a fixed, pre-political identity: 
it is constructed through the practices of politics.6 Hence, thirdly, in its crude 
form, the power-interest model and the critical mass thesis is not precise enough 
to explain the sharply diverging prostitution policy outcomes in European 
countries, where women and feminists have increased their parliamentary 
representation across the board.7 
                                                                    
4 Wängnerud, “Women in parliaments: Descriptive and substantive representation”; Celis and 
Childs, “Introduction: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women: New 
Directions.” 
5 Ekberg, “The Swedish law that prohibits the purchase of sexual services”; Eduards, 
Kroppspolitik: Om moder Svea och andra kvinnor, 174; Strøm, “A glimpse into 30 years of 
struggle against prostitution by the women's liberation movement in Norway.” 
6 Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women's Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to 
Critical Actors”; cf. Towns, “Understanding the Effects of Larger Ratios of Women in National 
Legislatures:.” 
7 See, for instance, Dodillet, “Cultural clash on prostitution: Debates on prostitution in Germany 
and Sweden in the 1990s.” 
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Another category of research instead turns its focus to public discourses. For 
instance, a number of studies discuss how the phenomena of prostitution, 
prostitutes and their clients are constructed in public discourses and how such 
discourses are mirrored in public policies. Prominent examples on the case of 
Norway include Skilbrei’s overview of Norwegian prostitution policy reform in 
the 1990s, which focuses on representations of prostitutes in the media and 
political debates, and Stenvoll’s analysis of how cross-border prostitution in the 
northern Finnmark region was described in the media in the 1990s.8 
This category of research often gives detailed, descriptive accounts of how 
prostitution is framed as a problem in public understanding. What’s missing in 
these studies, however, are explicit, explanatory accounts of how public 
discourses affect prostitution policy. While it seems likely that changes in mass 
media discourse, responding to changes in prostitution markets, do influence 
policy, describing that shift is only half the story. It needs to be complemented 
with a careful assessment of how policy entrepreneurs were able to draw on the 
discursive shift in order to achieve legislative success. While the outcome, in 
retrospect, might seem over-determined, it is produced by active, purposive 
agents. Policy makers might seek to resist changes in the broader ideational 
framework or selectively draw on available information in order to maintain their 
preferred stance. 
In this study, we draw on both of these approaches within an over-arching 
ideational framework. In international relations, comparative politics and related 
sub-fields, scholars who are engaged in ideational research share a broad interest 
in understanding what factors account for the increased salience of new ideas, the 
mechanisms through which ideas become embedded in various features of the 
polity, and the impact that ideas have on political processes.9 Successfully 
deploying ideas in support of policy objectives requires a synergy between ideas 
                                                                    
8 Stenvoll, “From Russia with Love?”; Skilbrei, “The rise and fall of the Norwegian massage 
parlours: Changes in the Norwegian prostitution setting in the 1990s.” 
9 Berman, “Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis.” 
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and the relevant institutional and cultural features of the polity.10 Thus, ideational 
scholars do not deny that actors, their level of strategic resources, and institutional 
design are crucial elements in understanding policy outcomes. Where an 
ideational approach differs is in emphasising the need for actors to “embed their 
arguments in persuasive ideational frameworks”.11 Indeed, placing ideas alongside 
more traditional explanatory variables, such as actors’ resources and the 
institutional framework, is a defining feature of contemporary integrated 
approaches to public policy, including Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework 
and Baumgartner & Jones’s emphasis on punctuated equilibria.12 Successfully 
nesting ideas for policy reform can be regarded as the mobilization of consent for 
policy.13 Within the field of international relations, the concept of grafting is used 
to describe a similar attempt at achieving policy change: entrepreneurs graft their 
reform idea onto existing international norms in order to improve the odds that 
governments will enact their proposals.14 A complementary argument is put 
forward by Kingdon who specifies how policy proposals need to “fit with the 
dominant values and current national mood” in order to be adopted.15 Taken 
jointly, these scholars stress that ideational accounts must demonstrate an explicit 
linkage between policy ideas and relevant ideational frameworks within the 
broader polity. An ideational approach thus augments mainstream perspectives on 
public policy reform, which focus on actors strategic capabilities and institutional 
constraints.  
NORWAY 
From Failure to Success  
                                                                    
10 Beland, “Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective”; Berman, “Ideas, Norms, and 
Culture in Political Analysis”; Cox, “The Social Construction of an Imperative: Why Welfare 
Reform Happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but Not in Germany”; Walsh, “When Do Ideas 
Matter?: Explaining the Successes and Failures of Thatcherite Ideas.” 
11 Hansen and King, “Eugenic Ideas, Political Interests, and Policy Variance: Immigration and 
Sterilization Policy in Britain and the U.S..” 
12 Sabatier, “The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe”; 
Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and instability in American politics. 
13 Gourevitch, “Keynesian Politics: The political sources of economic policy choices.” 
14 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” 
15 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
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In Norway, criminalising the purchase of sexual services has been on the agenda 
for decades. From the late 1970s and a decade onwards, the Joint Action Against 
Pornography and Prostitution gathered a broad, heterogeneous coalition against 
pornography and prostitution. Initiated by the Women’s League of the Centre 
Party (SP), the Joint Action included seemingly strange bedfellows: radical 
feminist groups such as the Women’s Front, far left parties such as the Maoist 
Worker’s Communist Party (AKP), Christian Democrats and church parishes, 
trade unions and the Norwegian Housewives’ Union. At its peak, it gathered some 
30–40 organisations claiming a total membership of ca 500,000 people and local 
groups across the country. Eventually dominated by the Women’s Front, the Joint 
Action combined awareness-raising campaigns and political lobbying with 
militant, direct action directed against porn shops and assumed clients of 
prostitutes.16 
In response to such activist demands in the 1980s, criminalising the purchase 
of sexual services was considered twice by the Department of Justice, in 1982-83 
and again in 1986-87, the latter occasion including a broad consultative hearing.17 
But whereas legislators in the mid-1980s heeded the Joint Action’s demands for 
sharpening the anti-pornography laws, criminalising the purchase of sexual 
services never gained the necessary political support. The Joint Action disbanded 
due to internal tensions in the early 1990s, but both pornography and prostitution 
continued to stir political controversy in Norway.18 
In the early 2000s, the issue of CPSS again rose on the agenda. In 2000, 
parliament criminalised the purchase of sexual services from minors, and the bill 
(Ot.prp. 28, 1999-2000) stated that a general sex purchase ban would be 
considered anew after two years. In the centre-right minority government from 
2001–05, only the Christian Democrats (KrF), leading the coalition, were in 
favour of criminalisation, unlike their Conservative (H) and Liberal (V) allies. 
                                                                    
16 Strøm, “A glimpse into 30 years of struggle against prostitution by the women's liberation 
movement in Norway”; Nilsen, “'Når man gir seg ut for horekunde, får man finne seg i 
karakteristikken': Kampar mot prostitusjon 1981-1991.” 
17 Justis- og politidepartementet, Ot.prp. nr. 48 (2007-2008), 1. 
18 For instance, NOU 1997:23, Seksuallovbrudd (Straffelovkommisjonens delutredning VI). 
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Still, in 2003, the Department of Justice appointed a working group to gather 
information and provide a broader knowledge base for deciding whether or not to 
criminalise the purchase of sexual services. Lead by law professor Ulf Stridbeck, 
the working group visited Sweden and the Netherlands and met with social 
agencies, police and other actors involved in implementing the two countries’ 
sharply diverging prostitution policies. Delivering its report on 8 October 2004, 
the working group advised against CPSS and Stridbeck publicly disputed the 
Swedish sex purchase ban in both Swedish and Norwegian press. 
Opening the window of opportunity: Palermo, Schengen, Oslo 
 
In the meantime, however, Norway had ratified the Palermo Protocols on human 
trafficking (St.prp. 58, 2002-2003). Adopted in 2000 by the United Nations in 
Palermo, Italy, the Palermo Protocols, as they are popularly called, signal what 
one scholar calls the meteoric rise of trafficking on the agenda of European 
countries.19 They also represent an interesting example of a so-called two-level 
game.20 At an earlier point in time the Palermo Protocols, too, where the results of 
political negotiations where both state representatives and various non-
governmental organisations struggled to have their preferred stance on trafficking 
written into the protocols, in order to allow them, at a later stage, to pursue their 
preferred policies domestically.21 Hence, as these protocols oblige states to 
undertake a variety of measures to combat the alleged increases in trafficking in 
human beings, yet are ambiguously and vaguely worded, they open up for both 
confusion and political manoeuvring as the protocols are supposed to be 
implemented nationally.22 
In the Nordic countries, the Palermo Protocols triggered revisions of domestic 
policies toward trafficking and prostitution. Moreover, the increased focus on 
                                                                    
19 Askola, Legal responses to trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the European Union. 
20 Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games.” 
21 Doezema, “Now You See Her, Now You Don't: Sex Workers at the UN Trafficking Protocol 
Negotiation.” 
22 For instance, Article 9.5 of the protocol reads as such: “States Parties shall adopt or strengthen 
legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures, including through 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of 
exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.” 
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trafficking in Europe around the turn of the millennium was further fuelled in 
Norway and the other Nordic countries by their full accession to the Schengen 
Area in 2001, and the eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007. While 
the Nordic Passport Union had facilitated intra-Nordic travel for decades, the 
Schengen area in principle (if not in practice) removed internal border controls 
with more than 20 other European countries. The increased freedom of movement 
in Europe seems to have triggered changes in prostitution markets, thus creating 
both opportunities and constraints for political actors to pursue prostitution policy 
change.23 
While these developments at the transnational and European level drew 
attention to the issue of trafficking, the situation also changed substantively at the 
street level in Oslo, as Nigerian women arrived on the scene in 2003. While street 
prostitution had long been dominated by foreign women, the number of Nigerian 
prostitutes increased from two in 2003 to 128 the next year and approximately 
400 by 2006.24 Additionally, partly in response to increased police presence in the 
traditional prostitution area, street prostitution moved from the backstreets in 
Kvadraturen, near Oslo Central Station, to the Karl Johan street.25 A boulevard 
stretching past the parliament, Oslo university, the national theatre up to the royal 
castle, Karl Johan street is a national monument in itself, a site for tourism, 
shopping and night life, but also for parades on the 17th of May, Norway’s 
national holiday. 
A handful of studies have sought to analyse how Norwegian press covered the 
sudden arrival of Nigerian prostitutes in the main cities of Norway. Synnøve 
Økland Jahnsen argues that media narratives revolved around three conflicts: the 
‘Norwegian prostitution market’, emphasising competition between women of 
different ethnic origins offering sexual services; the ‘Norwegian lines of tolerance 
                                                                    
23 Holmström and Skilbrei, Prostitusjon i Norden. 
24 However, fieldworkers claimed that the number of prostitutes had not increased: it was their 
attitude and skin colour that made the Nigerian prostitutes such a salient problem. For instance, 
Liv Jessen of the Pro-Senteret claimed that according to their estimates, the number of prostitutes 
had modestly increased from 562 to 704 in the course of 15 years. Aftenposten Aften 2006-06-29, 
Halve Oslo vil forby sexkjøp, cf. Stridbeck, “Prostitusjon i Norge: Realiteter, politikk og 
regulering,” 54; Jahnsen, “Women who cross borders,” 1. 
25 Jahnsen, “Women who cross borders,” 45. 
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and decency’, describing a conflict between prostitutes and ‘regular citizens’ in 
the use of public space; and ‘a global sex market’, which emphasises unequal 
relations between women and men and between Norway and Nigeria.26 Nigerian 
women in prostitution were portrayed, paradoxically, as both illegal aliens 
exploiting Norwegian men and as victims of cynical networks of trans-border 
crime.27 May-Len Skilbrei, too, discusses how recent public and political debates, 
both nationally and locally, have dealt with the phenomenon of Nigerian 
prostitutes in the streets of Oslo.28 Skilbrei notes that while traditional discourses 
victimise prostituted women, the terms of debate shifted in these years, casting 
“regular Norwegian men” as victims of aggressive marketing of sexual services, 
while the Nigerian women were singled out and blamed for pushing their trade in 
the wrong place (Karl Johan street) and in the wrong way (too aggressively). In 
effect, prostitution by Norwegian women, if not simply neglected, was construed 
as more orderly and less disturbing. As Simonsen argues, mass media rarely 
sought to provide nuanced, multi-faceted narratives, but rather downplayed the 
complex character of the problem.29 And as Jahnsen, Skilbrei and Simonsen all 
note, it’s hard to underestimate the symbolic importance of the Karl Johan street 
in the national context of Norway, and thus, public discourses not only construed 
prostitution as a nuisance for Norwegian men, but also as a taint on the pride of 
the capital and the nation.30 
In 2006, the issue of the Nigerian prostitutes surfaces on the political agenda. 
In April, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, MP of the Progress Party (FRP), suggested to 
reinstate paragraph 378 of the Penal Code, which banned “unambiguous 
exhortation or lewdness”. This, he argued, would mandate the police to target 
prostitutes and beggars on the streets of the capital, while safeguarding “the right 
of Norwegians to walk undisturbed on the Karl Johan”.31 In the ensuing debate, 
MPs Marit Nybakk (AP) and Ågot Valle (SV) sharply rebutted that the focus of 
                                                                    
26 Jahnsen, “Women who cross borders.” 
27 cf. Simonsen, “Ubehaget i journalistikken: Verden midt i blant oss,” 305f. 
28 Skilbrei, “Nigeriansk prostitusjon på norsk: Feil kvinner på feil sted.” 
29 Simonsen, “Ubehaget i journalistikken: Verden midt i blant oss.” 
30 Skilbrei, “Nigeriansk prostitusjon på norsk: Feil kvinner på feil sted,” 174. 
31 Skilbrei 176, Simonsen 307f. 
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debate should be on sexual slavery and how organised criminal networks kidnap, 
violate and kill women. Moreover, in the summer of 2006, [the city’s governing 
right-wing coalition] proposed to Oslo City Council to prohibit by local 
ordinances “the offering of sexual services in an aggressive or embarrassing way 
or in any other way that disturbs public peace, order and traffic.”32 After minor 
changes, the Progress Party, Labour, and the Conservatives (H) voted in favour, to 
the opposition of the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Liberals (V). However, the 
Police Directorate eventually refrained from implementing the decision.33 
Thus, this is where the decisive shift in the surrounding ideational framework 
occurs: It locks the political focus to the twin complex of transnational trafficking 
and the Nigerian prostitutes in the streets, which eclipsed alternative problem 
constructions. But policy entrepreneurs yet had to take advantage fully of the 
opportunity provided by this sea change in the political environment, and present 
the sex purchase ban as the proper solution. 
Building support for the ban 
 
At the same time as mass media increasingly reported on the Nigerian prostitutes 
in the streets of Norway’s main cities, the CPSS policy proposal passed critical 
landmarks. In 2006, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) 
congress decided to support a CPSS law, a decision which, as expected, had a 
strong impact on the centre-left coalition government, and the Centre Party came 
out in favour of criminalisation. A year later, after intense debates where the 
parties’ leadership faced harsh defeats, the congresses of the Socialist Left Party 
(SV) and the dominant Labour Party (AP) decided to support a sex purchase ban. 
Hence, by April 2007, criminalisation had gained the necessary support by the 
government parties, and could pass the final hurdle in parliament. However, this 
                                                                    
32 Skilbrei 170. 
33 Interestingly, the Oslo police seem to provide expert knowledge useful to policy entrepreneurs 
while also actively advocating criminalisation. Throughout the process of policy change, police 
spokespersons publicly argued that a ban would reduce the extent of prostitution and the 
associated disturbances of public order, and make Norway a less attractive destination for cross-
border trafficking (Aftenposten Aften 2006-06-29, Halve Oslo vil forby kjøp av sex; Dagsavisen 
2007-04-01, Politiets hallikjegere vil forby sexkjøp). Agnete Strøm also describes hoe the 
Women’s Front met high-ranking police officers###. 
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turning of the tide in 2006–7 raises the question whether this sudden change was 
triggered or related to, explicitly or implicitly, a corresponding sea-change in the 
broader public discourse. As we shall see, while policy proponents not always 
referred explicitly to the phenomenon of Nigerian women selling sex in the streets 
of Oslo, they almost exclusively presented the sex purchase ban as a solution to 
the problem of cross-border trafficking.  
The NCTU and the Centre Party come out in favour of CPSS 
 
In the 1990s, trade unions became a battle ground for prostitution policy in 
Norway. In 1992, prostitutes marched with the 1 May demonstrations in Oslo and 
elsewhere, demanding the right to be organised as sex workers.34 Radical 
feminists, sprung out of the Joint Action, countered by lobbying trade unions to 
“take a stand against prostitution and against legalizing prostitution as ‘work’.”35 
However, from the 1990s onward, the issue of trade unions and prostitution seems 
to have been debated primarily in terms of conventional categories of gender 
equality and (sex) workers’ rights, whereas the transnational dimension was less 
salient. 
In 2006, the NCTU decided to support criminalisation. In her 1 May speech, 
NCTU president Gerd-Liv Valla publicly endorsed criminalisation, arguing that 
Norway should follow Sweden’s example.36 In September, the NCTU gathered a 
national conference on prostitution and trafficking, where Valla stated that the 
union declined recognising sex work and organising prostitutes. While she argued 
that Norway had become an open and attractive market for the “sex industry”, she 
underlined that the NCTU supported criminalisation not in order to clean the 
streets, but as an expression of the equal worth of women and men.37 Other 
proposals circulating at the same time suggested that the trade unions should fire 
                                                                    
34 Renland, “Fra medsøstre til ofre, horer og streikbrytere.” 
35 Strøm, “A glimpse into 30 years of struggle against prostitution by the women's liberation 
movement in Norway.” 
36 Klassekampen 2006-05-02 Noreg må forby kjøp av sex 
37 Klassekampen 2006-09-08 Vil kriminalisera 
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representatives and employees who, in Norway or elsewhere, pay for sexual 
services (one trade union eventually decided on such a policy).38 
The next obstacle was passed in June 2006, as the eleven MPs of the Centre 
Party (SP), the smallest party of the governing red-green coalition, came out in 
favour of a sex purchase ban. Inga Marte Thorkildsen (SV), a critic of an outright 
sex purchase ban, had proposed to follow the Finnish example and criminalise 
only the purchase of sexual services from victims of trafficking.39 In response to 
Thorkildsen’s proposal, Erling Sande, SP’s criminal policy spokesperson, argued 
that “nobody can deny that prostitution had increased in Oslo” and that a 
wholesale ban of the purchase of sexual services would more efficiently curb 
trafficking:40 
The Centre Party has decided to support the criminalisation of the 
purchase of sexual services. We do so because trafficking in 
human beings is increasing. In our view, it is double standards to 
condemn, on the one hand, human trafficking, while on the other 
hand having a legal market for it in Norway.41 
Press commentaries saw the decision as a response to the Nigerian women selling 
sex in the Karl Johan Avenue.42 But as the other coalition partners were bound by 
decisions at their congresses to reject criminalisation, and, moreover, as the party 
leadership and government ministers of both SV and AP were outspoken 
opponents, time was not yet ripe for adopting a sex purchase ban.43 
The SV congress in 2007 
 
At the SV party congress, CPSS turned out to be one of the most contentious 
issues. At the two previous congresses (2005 and 2003), CPSS had been turned 
                                                                    
38 Aftenposten 2006-10-08 Vil sparke sexkjøpere, Aftenposten 2006-11-09  Forbyr sexkjøp. 
39 In 2005, Finland’s Centre-Social Democrat coalition government had introduced a bill that 
would have resulted in criminalisation, yet after heated debate, parliament rejected the bill in the 
summer of 2006, instead penalising only the purchase of sexual services from victims of human 
trafficking. 
40 Aftenposten 2006-11-06, Har ikke flertall 
41 Aftenposten 2006-06-16, Sp vil forby sexkjøp; Aftenposten Aften 2006-06-29, Halve Oslo vil 
forby kjøp av sex 
42 Klassekampen 2006-06-16, Fri eller tvungen. 
43 In response to SP’s decision, Anne Marit Bjørnflaten (AP) and Olav Gunnar Ballo (SV) 
underlined that their respective parties had rejected criminalisation (Aftenposten 2006-11-06, Har 
ikke flertall). 
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down, with narrow margins. The pro-CPSS wing was fronted by the Socialist 
Youth and its leader, Kirsti Bergstø, as well as the party branch in Hordaland 
county. Deputy Chairman Audun Lysbakken also strongly favoured CPSS. On the 
other side, MP Inga Marte Thorkildsen, a lone voice who had gained majority 
against CPSS on the past few congresses, was backed by party Chairman Kristin 
Halvorsen, and other influential female politicians, such as MP Karin Andersen. 
Interestingly, while arguments about trafficking figured in the debates, the 
opponents of criminalisation seem to have insisted on debating prostitution in 
general terms, focusing for instance on the need for social policy measures to help 
women out of prostitution. Proponents of CPSS, by contrast, seem to have mainly 
construed the problem to which they presented criminalisation as a solution, as 
transnational trafficking. Bergstø argued that the absence of a ban made Norway 
attractive for trafficking.44 “We are in favour of criminalising whore customers, in 
order to curb trafficking”, a regional party leader argued.45 Similarly, Lysbakken: 
We must, as a society, say what we think of buying another human 
being and of selling women and children across national borders. 
Criminalisation of sexual purchases is one of the measures we can 
take.46 
Halvorsen also referred to the new forms of street prostitution in the past few 
years: 
Many people witness prostitution that is much more aggressive and 
visible in several Norwegian cities. Many women experience it as 
offending, and wishes it to go away.47 
While Halvorsen also referred to the experiences of prostitutes and social workers 
she had talked to and argued that their opinion should be given the greatest 
weight, Bergstø claimed that Halvorsen and Thorkildsen had been duped by the 
ProSenteret, a field work centre in Oslo, the leader of which Liv Jessen 
                                                                    
44 Klassekampen 2007-03-24, Slåss om kriminalisering 
45 Ola Huke, fylkesleder, Sør-Trøndelag SV. 
46 Audun Lysbakken, Dagsavisen 2007-03-24, Kamp om sexkjøp 
47 Kristin Halvorsen (SV), Dagsavisen 2007-03-24 
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consistently argued against criminalisation.48 They also disagreed as to whether 
the Swedish experience supported criminalisation or yet needed to be thoroughly 
evaluated. 
Proponents of the ban, such as Lysbakken, also referred to the upcoming AP 
congress as a strategic opportunity not to miss.49 With NCTU and SP already in 
favour, SV taking a stance for CPSS would influence the congress of the 
internally divided AP, too, and provide SV an opportunity to change the coalition 
government’s policy. 
After a long debate extending into the night, a majority of the 205 delegates 
voted in favour of CPSS, and the statement framed criminalisation of clients as a 
means to curb trafficking: “As long as the purchase of sexual services is allowed, 
Norway will be a coveted destination for trade in human beings [menneskehandel] 
and trafficking of foreign prostitutes.”50 The decision was reported as a victory for 
Lysbakken and the youth wing, and a defeat for Chairman Halvorsen, supported 
only by 74 (78?) delegates.51 
Afterwards, a columnist in Dagsavisen claimed that the reason that the SV 
congress had turned in favour, was plain to see for anyone taking an evening stroll 
through Oslo city: “There, young Nigerian women walk from man to man in their 
hunt for a new whore customer. Trade in human beings [menneskehandelen] no 
longer takes place in the dark alleys around the Bank of Norway or in lugubrious 
basement brothels, but in the Karl Johan.”52 Likewise, the left-wing daily 
Klassekampen, favouring criminalisation, commented that current domestic and 
international measures had done little to reduce street prostitution.53 All in all, the 
trafficking discourse was dominant in the SV’s internal debate. With the SV then 
                                                                    
48 Klassekampen 2007-03-24, Slåss om kriminalisering. Dagsavisen 2007-03-24, Kamp om 
sexkjøp. 
49 Audun Lysbakken: “Ap kommer til å ta dette opp på sitt landsmøte. Nå har vi muligheten til å 
gå foran. Tiden er moden for at SV tar dette standpunktet.” (Dagsavisen 2007-03-24, Kamp om 
sexkjøp) 
50 Aftenposten 2007-03-25, Vil kriminalisere horekunder. However, the statement might also have 
proposed other measures than CPSS, such as working to change public attitudes and zero-tolerance 
for the PSS of civil servants (Klassekampen 2007-03-26, Lovforbod). 
51 Aftenposten 2007-03-25, Vil kriminalisere horekunder; Dagsavisen 2007-03-25 Kristins 
nederlag 
52  Dagsavisen 2007-03-25 Kristins nederlag 
53 Klassekampen, 2007-03-26, Lovforbud 
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in favour of CPSS, two out of three parties of the governing coalition were in 
favour, and the CPSS proposal just had one final hurdle to pass: The Labour 
Party.   
The AP congress in 2007  
 
The tipping point was the Labour Party congress in mid April 2007. Two years 
earlier, the congress had turned down criminalisation. This year, too, party 
leadership argued against the proposal, suggesting instead to give government 
more time to consider the issue, in a debate that stretched over several days.54 
Among those who entered the podium during the debate were party heavy-
weights such as Knut Storberget (Minister of Justice), Dag Terje Andersen 
(Minister of Industry), Helga Pedersen (Minister of Fisheries and vice party 
chairman) as well as Anniken Huitfeldt, leader of the women’s network, who all 
endorsed postponing the decision.55 Prime minister and party leader Jens 
Stoltenberg, however, did not declare a public opinion. 
Storberget argued that while trafficking was already criminalised, a prohibition 
of the purchase would have little effect and would be difficult to enforce. 
Moreover, he feared that prostitution would move indoors, making prostitutes 
more vulnerable and dependent on traffickers, and said that no firm, unequivocal 
conclusions could be drawn from the Swedish experience.56 Minister of Equality 
Karita Bekkemellem also passionately opposed criminalisation. In an interview, 
Bekkemellem said she feared that “the girls concerned would disappear under 
ground” and wished to wait until the Swedish experience had been thoroughly 
                                                                    
54 Before the congress, MPs Eirin Sund and Marianne Agdestein proposed to create a “red light 
district”, with health controls, taxation, audit and social rights for sex workers, in Oslo, Stavanger 
and other cities. Unsurprisingly, the proposal was dwarfed by the controversy on the sex purchase 
ban (Dagbladet 2007-04-19 Bobler under Jens). 
55 Previously undecided, Minister of Health Sylvia Brustad also publicly rejected criminalisation 
in the run-up to the congress, arguing that a ban would “force the business underground and lead 
to more brutal violence.” Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre sought to mediate between the 
opposing camps, suggesting that the congress should initiate a process intending for a ban, while 
also considering other options (Dagbladet 2007-04-15 Tviler seg til kompromiss). Storberget 
similarly sought to modify his opposition to the sex purchase ban, endorsing Støre’s compromise 
(Dagsavisen 2007-04-17 Benekter klar motstand mot sexkjøp-forbud). 
56 Dagsavisen 2007-03-29 ###. 
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investigated.57 She also said that regardless of what the congress decided, “it is 
very important to work with other measures against prostitution and trafficking.” 
Eva Kristin Hansen (MP and ex-leader of the youth wing) voiced strong worries 
over the ban, but also acknowledged that many party members felt increasingly 
frustrated “that this problem just keeps growing and growing, and look for means 
to stop it”.58 Two days before the congress decision, Anniken Huitfeldt met with 
prostitutes at Prosenteret, and said that 
it is a good social-democratic principle to listen to the people we 
wish to help, before we decide. In my view, the arguments for a 
prohibition fall short when meeting the girls who would be 
affected by such a prohibition.59 
Proponents of the ban included the youth wing AUF, the influential local branches 
in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Sør-Trøndelag and Hordaland, and, as already noted, 
the influential Confederation of Trade Unions. In Dagsavisen, Jan Bøhler, of Oslo 
AP (but also a former member of the AKP), said that the shifting stance within the 
party was due to the increasing visibility of prostitution over the past couple of 
years, arguing that trafficking and prostitution had “gained a whole new volume” 
and that a prohibition would reduce the market.60 
The situation is more difficult than ever in Oslo and other major 
Norwegian cities. We must use legislation to draw the line. We 
don’t want it to be such that you can buy victims of human 
trafficking in downtown Oslo.61 
Similarly, ex-MP Ane Tømmerås claimed that the situation was “worse than ever” 
in Oslo: 
It is more international, more organised, it occurs in more places 
and is more general. … Norway has become a haven for 
international prostitution.62 
                                                                    
57 Dagsavisen 2007-03-27  Ap-kamp om sexkjøp 
58 Dagsavisen 2007-03-27  Ap-kamp om sexkjøp 
59 VG 2007-04-20, Sier nei til å forby sex-kjøp 
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61 Dagsavisen 2007-04-16 Bøhler irritert på Støre 
62 Dagbladet 2007-04-20 Norge et fristed for sexhandel 
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During the congress, trade union representatives also argued for criminalisation, 
arguing that purchasing sex equals human trafficking, discrimination and abuse.63 
Interestingly, the internal division did not follow the traditional left-right 
dimension, as, for instance, some MPs associated with the party left were 
outspoken critics of the ban.64 Moreover, many regional branches of the party had 
not discussed the issue, let alone taken a stance, in preparation for the congress, 
and even among those branches that had decided in favour of criminalisation, 
congress delegations were internally divided.65 “It’s an important topic, but it’s 
far away from us, and we haven’t discussed it in the regional branch”, said Ingalill 
Olsen of Finnmark AP.66 Hence, prostitution was mainly construed as city 
problem, even though the Finnmark district was the scene of a similar media focus 
on cross-border prostitution in the 1990s.67 
Outsiders also sought to influence the debate before the AP congress. Oslo 
City’s tourism manager Tor Sannerud endorsed criminalisation by reference to 
Nigerian street prostitutes, saying that “tourists do not expect to face such a city 
scene when they come to Norway’s capital, and many are very puzzled that this 
happens in one of richest cities of the world.”68 Oslo police department also 
publicly criticised Storberget for resisting criminalisation and argued that a ban 
would reduce the extent of prostitution and the associated disturbances of public 
order, and make Norway a less attractive destination for cross-border 
trafficking.69 Gunilla Ekberg, an adviser to the former Swedish government and a 
spokesperson for the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, stated in an 
interview that “the difference in the volume of sales and purchases of Nigerian 
women shows with great clarity the difference between Sweden and Norway.”70 
Ekberg also implied that Norway was obliged by the Palermo Protocols to take 
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64 Klassekampen 2007-03-27 Åpen Ap-kamp om forbud 
65 ### 
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67 Stenvoll, “From Russia with Love?.” 
68 Aftenposten 2007-04-16 Rent og pent? 
69 Aftenposten Aften 2006-06-29, Halve Oslo vil forby kjøp av sex; Dagsavisen 2007-04-01, 
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measures to reduce the demand for sexual services. Mona Sahlin, leader of the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party, who visited the congress, dismissed the way 
opponents to the ban drew on the Swedish experience: “We are very satisfied with 
the result”, she said, although she refrained from advising the AP what decision to 
take.71 
Opposing the ban, by contrast, Prosenteret’s Liv Jessen argued that the sex 
purchase ban had done little to rid Sweden of the problem of trafficking, and that 
the number of people selling sex per capita was the same as in Norway.72 
Meanwhile, female prostitute ‘Gitte’ reportedly gathered 200 signatures from 
prostitutes urging the AP to reject criminalisation, but MP Marit Nybakk (AP), a 
proponent of criminalisation, refused to accept the petition and ‘Gitte’ was denied 
entry to the congress.73 In an interview, Nybakk said “There is no right to be a 
prostitute. We cannot allow sex slaves to be ravaged just because a Norwegian 
girl should have the right to sell herself.”74 
Eventually, though, 184 out of 300 delegates voted in favour of 
criminalisation, and both proponents and opponents rejected a compromise 
proposal from the editorial committee (which was internally divided too).75 Press 
reported the decision as a victory for the youth wing, for influential regional 
branches of the party, including Oslo AP, and for certain members of parliament, 
who managed to win the support of the congress.76 Bøhler interpreted the decision 
as a means to solve the problem of Nigerian street prostitution in Oslo: 
The congress wanted to take charge. It’s a matter of decency. It is a 
moral crisis that we have 700 Nigerian prostitutes in Oslo who are 
victims of degradation and exploitation.77 
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Presenting the bill 
 
With all three coalition partners endorsing criminalisation (as had, previously, the 
Christian Democrats), a broad parliamentary majority now supported a sex 
purchase ban. A year later, in April 2008, Storberget presented the bill (Ot. Prp. 
48 [2007-2008]) and the responses to the bill during the consultative hearing 
largely fit the dominant framing: Regardless of their stance on the issue of 
criminalisation as such, most instances seemed to regard the ban as a solution to 
the problem of cross-border trafficking, rather than other problems, such as 
gender inequality, social exclusion, etc. 
And when the law was passed, finally, proponents justified it almost 
exclusively in terms of trafficking. Justice Minister Knut Storberget (AP), one of 
the fiercest critics of criminalisation only a year earlier, stated that the bill’s 
purpose was to make Norway less exposed to trafficking:  
[h]uman beings are not a commodity and criminalizing the 
purchase of a sexual act will make Norway less attractive for the 
traffickers. Our goal is to change attitudes, reduce the demand and 
thus reduce the potential market for the traffickers. Criminalizing 
shall not make the situation for women in prostitution worse; 
therefore the government will develop alternatives of livelihood for 
women in prostitution.78 
In sum, throughout these debates, the trafficking discourse seems to have eclipsed 
alternative understandings of what the of prostitution is. While opponents to CPSS 
seem to have relied more on alternative conceptions of prostitution, this is not to 
say that construing of prostitution as a social problem which has domestic roots, 
too, or as a problem of gender inequality, leads one to reject CPSS – it could well 
have been justified in those terms too, just as rejecting it could have been justified 
in terms of trans-border trafficking. But the fact that the debate actually took this 
path and that proponents achieved political and legislative success with such 
arguments, indicates that policy entrepreneurs could make use of the shift in 
public discourse and present the sex purchase ban as a solution to the twin 
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problems of transnational trafficking and the Nigerian prostitutes in the streets of 
Oslo. Hence, the political discourse left little doubt that the purpose of passing the 
bill was to address the problem of trafficking as indicated by the presence of 
Nigerian street prostitutes in the Karl Johan. 
SWEDEN 
Early Legislative Activity, and the Rise of Gender Equality among Policymakers 
The question of regulating prostitution has been frequently addressed by the 
Swedish Riksdag over the past three decades.  Naturally, it is beyond the scope of 
this article to offer a comprehensive overview of the details associated with all of 
this parliamentary activity.  Moreover, various aspects of the attempts by Swedish 
policymakers to regulate prostitution have been examined in a rich historiography 
(largely in Swedish, albeit with some shorter analyses in English) that has 
emerged in recent years.79  In offering a condensed account of the Swedish case, 
our aim is to highlight how increasingly salient gender equality ideas were 
successfully deployed by pro-CPSS policy entrepreneurs.  However, we do not 
argue that gender equality ideas constitute a sufficient condition in and of 
themselves to have resulted in CPSS.  Rather, these ideas represent the principled 
beliefs grafted by pro-ban actors onto more broadly accepted causal stories of 
prostitutes as having abusive and vulnerable backgrounds.80 Taken jointly, gender 
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equality ideas and accounts of abuse resulted in a line of argumentation that was a 
particularly effective discursive weapon, one that anti-CPSS actors found difficult 
to counter.  As such, the Swedish CPSS debate of the 1990s sounded very little 
like its Norwegian counterpart. 
 Prior to the 1990s, three key instances of parliamentary activity stand out 
in terms of efforts by Swedish policymakers to grapple with the regulation of 
prostitution. First among these was the Sexual Crime Investigation, convened in 
1972, with the final report released in 1976.81  Alongside discussions and 
proposals to redraft legislation regarding various aspects of the age of consent, 
incest and rape, the report also addressed prostitution.  As Dodillet has shown, 
while some analyses have portrayed the report as advocating the complete 
deregulation of procuring, such was not the case.  Rather, the report specifically 
identified both brothels and procuring as features of the commercial sex industry 
that were to be prohibited, and justified doing so on the basis of societal morals.  
Many of the author’s proposals were deemed controversial, with some 
organizations filing official responses that criticized the report for not 
emphasizing the capitalistic nature of Swedish society and its links to sexual 
crimes, as well as the duty of the state to foster ‘equal sexual rights’.82  The end 
result was the shelving of the report and the commissioning of two new separate 
parliamentary investigations, one addressing sexual crime, and one focusing on 
prostitution.   
Second, the subsequent 1977 Prostitution Investigation was no less 
controversial.  In this instance, however, a substantial amount of the attention was 
focused on the internal split between the chief investigator Inger Lindquist, on the 
one hand, and the secretaries and external experts on the other.  According to the 
original chief secretary, Hanna Olsson, Lindquist’s opposition to prostitution 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to stop the harm.” Of course, our 
emphasis here on linking ideas and causal stories should not be taken to exclude the significance 
of actors in bringing about this process.  See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: 
Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International 
Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 185-214.   
81 (SOU 1976:9) Sexuella övergrepp: förslag till ny lydelse av brottsbalkens bestämmelser om 
sedlighetsbrott. 
82 Dodillet 2008,  pp. 75-79. 
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being framed by the secretaries and external experts as stemming from patriarchal 
society led her to replace the original staff and attempt to shelve their report.83 
Olsson depicts the mindset of Lindquist pointedly, stating that she neither wanted 
their analysis published, nor did Lindquist believe that their texts should have 
been read by members of parliament.84 Östergren suggests that this sharp divide 
between the two, if not inevitable, was certainly evident from the outset of the 
investigation, with Olsson openly announcing her opposition to prostitution, while 
Lindquist remained ambivalent about the potential effects of criminalization.85 
With new secretaries and external experts in place, Lindquist’s report was 
presented to parliament in 1981.  While maintaining that prostitution in Sweden 
had fallen since the early 1970s, certain actions were still necessary in order to 
bring about its further reduction.  Chief among these was the prohibition of public 
pornographic performances (the only proposed measure enacted), as well as 
criminalizing the purchase of sexual services from a prostitute under the influence 
of narcotics, a broader application of existing legal measures against procurement, 
and allowing for prosecution of landlords with knowledge that a property had 
been let to those involved in procurement.  The Lindquist report was explicit in 
condemning prostitution as being inconsistent with a society valuing individual 
freedom and equality of the sexes.  Despite this, criminalization was not proposed, 
as doing so was deemed likely to have multiple undesirable consequences, 
including: pushing the sex trade underground, placing female prostitutes at risk, 
creating enforcement difficulties, and being unlikely to act as a meaningful 
deterrent.86 
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 Yet, while this wave of legislative activity in the 1970s and 1980s did not 
result in the adoption of a CPSS ban, a specific understanding of gender equality 
had been taking hold among Swedish political elites and relevant actors within 
civil society.  As Sainsbury has shown, a gradual process unfolded from the late 
1960s to the mid-1990s, in which a broadly categorized women’s movement 
effectively redefined women’s issues as matters of gender equality. This 
“discursive turn” is judged to have been strategically crucial, in that goals of the 
Swedish women’s movements could no longer be regarded as particularistic when 
advanced under the mantle of more general societal norms central to democratic 
societies, namely equality and democracy. 87  Gender equality should, in the 
context of the political strategies of the Swedish women’s movement, be 
understood as having a very specific meaning and strategic function.  In terms of 
the former, gender equality is characterized by an emphasis on equal outcomes for 
men and women, as opposed to merely equal opportunities.  Moreover, state 
interventionism is regarded as a particularly powerful and important instrument in 
the campaign to attain gender equality.88  In term of the latter, gender equality 
differs from the Marxist-inspired emancipatory term of ‘equality’ (understood as 
more broadly targeting the eradication of class differences) in that it explicitly 
identifies a particular variant of equality.  By focusing on gender as a category of 
equality, the term provided an explicit rallying call for women’s movement goals, 
regardless of political affiliation, and also facilitated the inclusion of similarly-
oriented men.89  Epistemic actors in Sweden contributed conceptual tools that 
facilitated a gendered analysis of existing conditions preventing the attainment of 
gender equality.  Perhaps most prominent among these would be historian Yvonne 
Hirdmann, who popularized the term “genus system” in the late 1980s, 
characterized by two related principles:  a logic of dichotomy, in which male and 
female attributes are to be kept distinct, and a logic of hierarchy, in which men are 
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considered the societal norm.90  Such broader analyses dovetailed nicely with 
existing Scandinavian scholarly research that was focused more narrowly on the 
commercial sex trade, wherein an explicit emphasis was placed on the unequal 
power relations that were assumed to be inherent in the prostitute-client 
relationship.91 
From the 1970s through the 1990s, successive Swedish governments made 
steadily increased reference to gender equality in conjunction with bills presented 
to the parliament.  In the 1970s, the term appeared 637 times, in the 1980s gender 
equality was mentioned 732 times, and in the 1990s, gender equality is referred to 
866 times in government bills.92 Governmental activity focusing on gender 
equality during this period included the appointment of several investigative 
committees, leading to a number of major reports, including “Women in State 
Service” [Kvinnor i statlig tjänst (SOU 1975:43)], examining the working 
conditions of women working within the state; “Steps On The Way” [Steg på väg 
(SOU 1979:56)], resulting from the1975 UN Women’s Conference in Mexico 
City, in which states were called upon to develop a national gender equality plan; 
and, “Every Other Seat For A Woman” [Varannan damernas (SOU 1987:19)], 
charged with identifying strategies for increasing women’s political 
representation. 
While women made significant gains in terms of parliamentary 
representation, the outcome of the 1991 parliamentary elections, in which the 
number of female MPs fell by four percent to 34%, represented something of a 
formative moment for contemporary Swedish politics.  According to Rothstein, a 
formative moment is “distinguished by the fact that existing political institutions 
(are) so incapacitated as to be incapable of handling the crisis.”93  Of course, we 
by no means argue that the reduction in the number of women MPs constituted a 
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genuine dire threat to the workings of Swedish parliamentary democracy.  Yet, 
there is no question that the political fallout of the election constituted a very real 
challenge to the existing cleavage structure.  Specifically, in the period leading up 
the subsequent 1994 parliamentary election, a feminist network, Stödstrumporna 
(Support Stockings) emerged, threatening to run candidates in the election, if the 
established political parties did not field a greater number of female candidates 
and put more emphasis on issues of gender equality.94  Briefly, key figures in the 
SAP women’s organization, S-kvinnor, floated the claim that some members were 
considering defecting from the party and running its own slate of candidates, 
claiming inspiration from the establishment of Stödstrumporna.95 The result of 
this ad hoc pressure group activity was clear, with many Swedish political parties, 
most notably the Social Democrats, integrating issues central to women’s 
movement into the mainstream of party concerns.  The 1994 election saw an 
increase in the number of female MPs to forty percent, and the Support Stockings 
faded from the political limelight.  However, gender equality ideas were now 
increasingly entrenched within the SAP, the government, and other parliamentary 
parties.  As Gourevitch has observed, “To become policy, ideas must link up with 
politics, the mobilization of consent for policy. Politics involves power. Even a 
good idea cannot become policy if it meets certain kinds of opposition, and a bad 
idea can become policy if it is able to obtain support.”96  Gender equality ideas 
had now found a significantly broadened and secure base of power within the 
Swedish political establishment, and would effectively be drawn upon in order to 
promote CPSS.  
The 1995 Sex Trade Report:  Origins, Proposals and Public Comments 
 The impact of the political fallout from the 1991 parliamentary elections 
upon the Swedish prostitution debate did not need to wait an additional election 
cycle.  In December 1992, Liberal Minister of Gender Equality Bengt Westerberg 
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announced that an investigative committee would be appointed to map out the 
extent of prostitution-related activity, nearly one decade after the last such effort.  
Even with this initial announcement, it was made explicit that the question of 
‘criminalizing the john’s actitivity would fall under the report’s remit.97  
Westerberg appointed the former ombudsman for gender equality, Inga-Britt 
Törnell to the post of sole investigator for the report.  In comments to the press in 
conjunction with her appointment, Törnell emphasized the difficulty of making a 
decision as to whether or not prostitution should be criminalized: 
Through criminalization, state authorities take a stand against 
prostitution.  On the other hand, it could push (prostitution) further 
into the dark.  As such, it’s a very difficult and sensitive question.  
Spontaneously, I believe that we should be offering help and support 
to those who risk become trapped in prostitution.98 
 
Shortly thereafter, Westerberg also ordered the establishment of the Women’s 
Violence Commission (Kvinnovåldskommissionen), whose mandate was “from a 
women’s perspective, to conduct an overview of questions that have to do with 
violence against women and propose remedies for counteracting such violence.”99 
At this early stage in the reform process, prostitution and women’s violence had 
been made the remits of different investigative bodies.  Yet, the two issues would 
subsequently be formally merged under one piece of proposed legislation, 
reflecting the degree to which a gendered analysis had become central to the 
understanding of prostitution as a problem and the policies that were thought an 
effective remedy. 
 Despite initial reservations towards criminalizing prostitution, Törnell’s 
final report, The Sex Trade, [Könshandeln (SOU 1995:15)] proposed just that.  
Characterizing prostitution as a phenomenon inconsistent with modern society, 
Törnell argued that the ability of men to purchase access to female genitalia in 
order to satisfy their own sexual desires went against efforts to ensure gender 
equality between men and women.  Similarly, the commercialization of sexuality 
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1993-03-13. 
99 Prop. 1997/98:55, Kvinnofrid, p. 19. 
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inherent in prostitution was deemed at odds with the prevailing views of 
democratic society. The commercial sex trade was argued to undermine the 
physical and psychological well-being of female prostitutes, with assault, 
substance abuse and mental health problems all considered side-effects of 
engaging in sex work. 100  While acknowledging the potential for a criminalization 
of prostitution to result in the sex trade being pushed further underground, an 
increase in procurement, and a variety of challenges associated with enforcement, 
Törnell argued that criminalizing both the buyer and the seller was desirable.  In 
motivating her stance, Törnell maintained that doing so would serve an important 
normative function, bringing about increased gender equality and signaling 
societal opposition to the sex trade.  Criminalization was assumed to have a 
deterrent effect for both buyers and sellers, and was seen as a device for women to 
resist efforts to get them to enter the sex trade.101  Interestingly, months before the 
report was released, Törnell was quoted in media reports as rejecting the CPSS 
stance, as such a policy would ‘go against principles of gender equality’, allowing 
for women to be portrayed as victims and lacking in agency.102 Not unlike 
prostitution reports commissioned by previous Swedish governments, the Törnell 
report was also plagued by a fair degree of controversy and internal dissent.  
Professor Sven Axel Månsson, one of the academic experts appointed to the 
report, resigned in protest at Törnell’s public comments, and also announced his 
support for the CPSS stance.103 Two other experts assigned to the report wrote 
separate dissenting opinions criticizing Törnell’s conclusions, one calling for no 
criminalization, while the other advocating CPSS.104 
 When looking at the written responses submitted by various actors (both 
state and non state), roughly 40% opposed the call to criminalize both the buyer 
and seller, and instead supported the CPSS stance.105  Ultimately, we think there 
                                                                    
100 Könshandeln (SOU 1995:15). 
101 Förbud mot köp av sexuell tjänst En utvärdering 1999–2008 (SOU 2010: 49) pp. 70-71. 
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in terms of stance.  For alternate assessments, see BRÅ “Förbud mot köp av sexuella tjänster: 
Tillämpningen av lagen under första året” (2004), p. 14, Dodillet (2008) pp. 382-383 and 
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is little to be gleaned from comparing the numbers of those for or against a 
specific proposal, as one needs to take into account that some responses 
represented the views of only one individual, while others represented the 
executive bodies of large regional governments.  Rather, the value of these written 
responses comes in examining how arguments for a specific policy preference 
were articulated – in this case, those who supported CPSS. Of particular interest 
are those that developed a logic for why Törnell’s proposal ought to be rejected 
and why CPSS ought to emerge as the eventual policy option.  Common to many 
of these more elaborated statements was a combined emphasis on the desire for 
broader societal equality, and how this would be undermined if already vulnerable 
women were to have their actions characterized as criminal.  In some instances, 
ideas about gender equality, while a component in the logic, were not given 
explicit prominence, such as in the case of S-kvinnor: 
At its core, prostitution is, as the report has shown, an unequal 
relationship.  The majority of prostitutes find themselves in a very 
vulnerable position.  This is reflected in, among other things, the 
injuries of a physical, psychological and social character that impact 
female prostitutes to a great extent.  Therefore, it should only be the 
customers’ actions that are criminalized.  An additional reason for this 
is that purchasers of sexual services are more difficult to locate, and, in 
a situation where both parties are criminal, the police will direct their 
activities against prostitutes.  The risk, in practice, is apparent that it 
would just be the one party, that is the women, who would be charged 
and punished. In that sense, an unequal situation would only be 
reinforced.106 
 
In other instances, such ideas received a much greater pride of position, as in the 
written comments submitted by ROKS (The National Organization of Women’s 
Shelters in Sweden): 
ROKS believes that the structural societal perspective as to male 
dominance and female subordination is the overarching explanation 
for the occurrence of prostitution… The sex trade is not a trade based 
on equal conditions…  The fundamental stance in all work with 
prostitution ought to be:  No prostitution is voluntary!  We 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Lernestedt and Hamdorf, p. 856.   
106 S-kvinnors yttrande över prostitutionsutredningens betänkande, SOU 1995:15 
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categorically reject the investigator’s proposal that both partners in 
‘the sex trade’ should be criminalized.  
…. 
We propose a criminalization of only the purchaser. In the supporting 
documentation (to the report), it is clearly confirmed as to the power 
relation between the parties:  the ‘seller’s’ powerlessness, resulting 
from drugs and alcohol, sexual assault in childhood – 80% to 90% 
according to research, low self-esteem, etc. If one these adds a gender 
equality perspective to the discussion, the logic stops abruptly.107 
 
The explicit linkage between gender equality ideas and a conviction that CPSS 
was necessary to protect vulnerable women was also articulated by bourgeois 
political organizations, such as the Women’s Association of the Center Party 
(Centerkvinnorna): 
…it’s time for society to mark its stance against those men who use 
psychologically and socially vulnerable women (and sometimes men) 
as goods for purchase.  The sex trade is no business agreement 
between equal partners.  Therefore, the report’s proposal that both the 
buyer and seller of sexual services should be criminalized is 
unacceptable.  Such a decision would constitute a societal signal that 
such activity occurs under equal conditions. 
 
Instead, it is the case that most women (and men) who are prostitutes 
have often been exposed to sexual assault as children.  Many suffer 
from self-hate, have serious drug problems and live in social misery.  
By criminalizing the purchaser of sexual services, as we propose, 
society instead sides with the vulnerable party.  It also marks the 
responsibility of those who find themselves in the socially superior 
position, namely the male purchaser.   Criminalizing those who 
purchase sexual services, that is to say the customers, will also be a 
way to have an impact on male attitudes towards women in the long 
run.108 
 
The next major setting in which gender equality ideas would be nested alongside 
notions of victimhood about would be the 1997 SAP party congress, where the 
party would take a stance in support of CPSS, against the wishes of the party 
leadership.   
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The Governing Social Democrats Take A Stance 
Five months before the SAP government would publish its bill proposing CPSS, 
party delegates met for the annual congress (dubbed the ‘Congress of the Future’) 
in the northern city of Sundsvall.  Four party districts, including two from the 
major urban areas of Stockholm and Göteborg, had submitted motions calling for 
the party to adopt a CPSS stance.109  In rejecting the calls from these districts, 
party leadership did not deny the central role of a gendered analysis in addressing 
prostitution: 
(Prostitution) involves women being exploited and degraded and it 
counteracts our striving towards equality between men and 
women…The party central committee considers it out of the question 
to criminalize prostitutes.  That would be inhumane and lead to the 
women being put en par with her exploiter.  Prostitution is one of the 
most extreme consequences of man’s domination and women’s 
subordination.110 
 
Despite affirming the significance of ideas concerning gender equality for 
analyzing prostitution, the central committee nonetheless opted to oppose any 
form of criminalization, not by invoking competing normative ideas, but rather by 
reference to assumed difficulties of implementation thought to render CPSS 
ineffective:   
First, there is the difficulty that, regardless of whether 
(criminalization) applies to one or both partners, drawing a sufficiently 
clear distinction as to the occurrence of a criminal activity.  Moreover, 
both the prostitute and the purchaser lack any interest in having the 
crime revealed, which leads to additional difficulties in proving 
criminal activity…Another reason is that prostitution would likely 
become even more invisible than it is today and, as a result, be more 
difficult to control. This could lead to an increased risk of violence and 
assault of prostitutes. 
/// 
The advantages (of CPSS) are insufficient when weighed against the 
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disadvantages.  There is often an excessive degree of faith in 
criminalization as society’s only way to should strong engagement in a 
question.  But, as long as criminalization can’t be shown to have an 
effect, and as criminalization of only one party is not a navigable way 
forward, and as long as there is a better alternative to criminalization – 
social measures – then the central committee believes that there is not 
cause for introducing criminalization.111 
 
In the debate that followed, heated rhetoric occasionally framed the vote as 
having dire consequences in the struggle for gender equality, as witnessed in the 
remarks of Carina Brandt, who implored: 
If (this vote) goes so far as to a roll call, you should know that the 
green button stands for continued exploitation of society's daughters 
and the red button for stop! Comrades, push the red button!112 
 
In the face of this, Minister of Gender Equality Laila Freivalds sought to defend 
the central committee’s anti-criminalization stance through a reiteration of the 
difficulties in combating prostitution that would result from CPSS, making 
reference to both the increased likelihood that a ban would push the sex trade 
further underground and that other states that had tried criminalization, such as 
Canada, had been unsuccessful.  Her remarks led to an interesting exchange with 
S-kvinnor chair Inger Segelström, one that highlights the way in which epistemic 
actors are selectively inserted into the debate by actors on different sides of the 
prostitution policy debate.  In challenging the claims of those who saw CPSS as 
likely to have positive effects, Freivalds reminded the congress of the critical 
assessment of police officials: 
According to law enforcement officials in the four cities where 
prostitution occurs today, three of those believe that criminalization 
would make their work more difficult. One of the county police chiefs 
puts it like this: The women get to pay the highest price for an 
eventual criminalization. The police and the women have built up a 
relationship that protects the women. That would be torn down.113 
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Segelström’s response acknowledged that the broad cluster of law enforcement 
officials had lines up against the ban, but suggested that there were other 
important actors whose views had to be considered: 
The police, prosecutors and lawyers are against criminalization. But 
the politicians on the city councils in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö 
have said that it is time to criminalize, because this situation can't be 
dealt with any longer. Who rules -- the politicians or the lawyers? Vote 
the right way!114 
 
Again though, CPSS proponents meshed gender equality ideas together with 
accounts of victimhood, and in doing so, argued that the result was a compelling 
logic that should take precedent over any concerns that a ban might be 
counterproductive.  Such a stance was perhaps most concisely articulated in the 
comments of Christina Palmqvist, who maintained that: 
Prostitution can't, in all likelihood, be fully legislated away, but via the 
criminalization of 'johns', we take a stance that it's not in keeping with 
our view of humanity to exploit the economically weak partner who 
has difficulties and, who instead, needs our help. Prostitution is the 
confirmation of women's subservience both in terms of power and in 
terms of economics. 'Now I've paid and now you're going to do as I 
say!' That's the 'message of the john'.115 
 
In a debate where only two of the eighteen speakers supported the line of the 
party leadership, and in which a prevailing sense among opponents was that 
prostitution constituted a direct expression of female oppression, the outcome can 
be seen as a foregone conclusion.  The SAP decided to show that, in the words of 
Segelström, as “the world's most gender equal party in the world's most gender 
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equal society, we can no longer accept that men can use money to buy women.”116 
The Women’s Peace Bill: Proposal, Parliamentary Debate and Adoption 
As noted previously, an investigation parallel to Törnell’s had been commissioned 
by Westerberg, charged with mapping out the extent of violence against women 
in Swedish society and proposing countermeasures.  In February 1998, a 
government bill was presented to the parliament addressing the findings of both 
reports.  Titled Women’s Peace (Kvinnofrid), the bill made clear the close link 
between the two issues: 
Both the Women’s Violence Commission and the Prostitution 
Investigation address questions that, to a great extent, have to do with 
conditions between men and women, conditions that that have 
significance for gender equality, both in individual cases and well as 
for society as a whole.  To that extent, these questions can be seen as 
related to one another.  Men’s violence against women is incompatible 
with efforts for a gender equal society and must be combated by all 
means.  It’s also unworthy of such a society, and unacceptable, that 
men acquire temporary sexual relations with women through 
compensation.117 
With gender equality firmly anchored as an underlying rationale for the overall 
package of legislative measures, the section focusing on prostitution policy 
reform rejected Törnell’s proposal and instead advocated CPSS and motivated 
such a choice on the now familiar basis of protecting vulnerable individuals: 
…even if prostitution as such is not a desirable societal phenomenon, 
it is not reasonable to criminalize the one who, at least in the majority 
of the cases, is the weaker party who is exploited by others who want 
to satisfy their own sexual desires.118 
 
In contrast to the doubts raised by Freivalds in 1997, the government bill argued 
confidently that the legislation would likely have the desired effects, with men not 
purchasing sexual services out of fear of conviction and with police having 
greater authority to conduct investigations.  The notion that the sex trade would 
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be driven under ground was also rejected, with the government claiming that as 
offering the sale of sexual services would not be made illegal, there was not likely 
to be any difference in the degree to which the sex trade remained visible.119 
 By the time of the May 1998 parliamentary debate that preceded the vote, 
the SAP, the Left Party, the Greens and the Center Party had thrown their support 
behind the proposed CPSS, while the Moderates, and the Liberals were opposed 
to any form of criminalization.  For their part, the Christian Democrats backed 
Törnell’s 1995 proposal, in which both parties would be subject to criminal 
prosecution.  At this late stage in the legislative process, the respective camps 
trotted out the expected and familiar arguments.  CPSS opponents voiced 
skepticism as to whether a ban would have the desired effect, whereas proponents 
not only brushed such concerns aside, but also situated their arguments within 
broader rhetoric having to do with both gender quality and victimhood.   
Moderate Party MP Jeppe Johnsson opened the debate on CPSS by 
invoking supporting expert knowledge in the form of fifteen separate written 
responses to the Törnell report, filed by various state agencies, law enforcement 
officials, academic departments within universities, as well as interest groups.  
Johnsson highlighted the way in which specific epistemic actors both questioned 
the assumed effectiveness of CPSS in combating prostitution, as well as arguing 
how a ban would hinder successful anti-prostitution measures to date.120  In 
further highlighting the discrepancy between the written responses from these 
epistemic actors and the government bill, Johnsson pointed out that the Council 
on Legislation (Lagrådet), whose official mandate is to carry out judicial preview 
on proposed legislation, had observed that CPSS was being put forward in the 
face of substantial written criticism.121 Liberal Party MP Lennart Rohdin made a 
similar argument questioning the legislation’s impact, noting that it hadn’t “been 
demonstrated that criminalization solves any problems, rather, it may worsen 
them.”122  Rohdin also called into question the governmental motives behind 
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proposing CPSS, suggesting that the real intent lay not with combating 
prostitution, but in taking a normative stance: 
I have a feeling that even if we were in agreement that criminalization was 
of no help to prostitutes, that the need by many for this moral 
condemnation is so great that it would still determine the outcome.123 
 
In terms of proponents, Ulrica Messing, the SAP labor market minister 
who had been responsible for drafting the Women’s Peace bill, expressed the 
standard view that support for CPSS was driven by concerns over gender 
equality: 
We think that prostitution is one of the worst expressions of the uneven 
division of power between men and women, and that it doesn’t just impact 
prostitutes or those who purchase their services, but all of society.  That’s 
why we propose a criminalization of the purchaser.  We are convinced that 
this will result in changed attitudes and decrease violence in society.  We 
are also convinced that this will reduce prostitution.124  
 
Left Party MP Alice Åström argued that support for CPSS, and not the seller, was 
a intended to prevent continued harm to female prostitutes thought largely to have 
had abusive upbringings: 
(The point has also been made) that this is a social problem, that 
these women, most often, are addicts and that they have been 
exposed to sexual assault, for example incest, during childhood.  
There are those tragic underlying stories.  Research and studies 
show this.  But that’s precisely why we’ve chosen the solution not 
to criminalize the prostitutes.  We’re specifically criminalizing the 
purchasers of sexual services, who continue to exploit and oppress 
these women.125 
 
Segelström, who has been one of the instrumental pro-CPSS speakers at the 1997 
SAP party congress, neatly encapsulated the overall argument in favor of the ban, 
linking gender equality to accounts of abuse, and specifically noting that backing 
from epistemic actors for the proposed policy did exist: 
                                                                    
123Op. cit. 
124Riksdagens snabbprotokoll, Protokoll 1997/98:114, 1998-05-28, Anf. 109.  
125Riksdagens snabbprotokoll, Protokoll 1997/98:114, 1998-05-28, Anf. 5. 
 37 
We’ve had support from the big cities, Stockholm, Göteborg and 
Malmö, all of whom in their written responses to the Prostitution 
Investigation have requested this solution, because they say 
they’ve tried and tried with projects and information for decades, 
but that they’ve always failed… We social democratic women 
cannot, in the world’s most gender equal parliament, allow that 
men can purchase women with money.  We work for gender 
equality in all areas… We cannot accept that roughly half of these 
women are drug addicts.  From what they’ve told me, they’re not 
prostitutes in order to buy food, pay their rent or to live a life of 
luxury, rather they do so in order to finance their heroin abuse, 
every day of the year.126  
 
While the debate drew to a close on an ambiguous and nuanced note, with Liberal 
Party MP Barbro Westerholm (whose overall party opposed CPSS, but whose 
women’s association backed the ban) acknowledging that there were clearly 
different points of view as to the most effective legal strategy for reducing 
prostitution127, the outcome of the vote the following day was not.  Only the 
Moderate Party and the bulk of the Liberals voted against the bill, with the 
Christian Democrats abstaining.  Through a campaign that had repeatedly invoked 
ideas of gender equality, and by linking those to accepted causal stories about the 





In this paper, we have sought to explain, respectively why Norway and Sweden 
decided to ban the purchase of sexual services. While some have suggested that 
the Norwegian policy outcome was the result of the successful lobbying of 
feminists in the so-called women’s movement, our account of the process sheds 
some doubt over such a narrative. For certain, women’s groups were an important 
actor in the process, lobbying trade unions and parties from within to endorse 
criminalisation and prompting the police with information. However, our analysis 
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of the debates show that conventional feminist arguments were largely 
sidestepped in the process leading to the adoption of the ban. Instead, policy 
entrepreneurs re-tailored the sex purchase ban as a solution to the problem of 
transnational trafficking, of which the public had grown acutely aware after the 
arrival in 2003 of Nigerian prostitutes in the streets of Oslo and other main cities 
in Norway, and the related mass media coverage. Moreover, our study 
complements previous studies by pointing out that there was in fact a direct 
linkage between the shift in public discourses and the policy stances of key actors, 
most notably the political parties in the governing coalition. While several studies 
have concluded that public perceptions of prostitution changed substantively after 
the arrival of the Nigerian prostitutes, such conclusions would be corroborated by 
a more detailed account of prostitution policy debates prior to 2003. 
 In contrast, our analysis of the Swedish case shows that ideas regarding 
gender equality, especially as linked to conventionally-accepted causal stories 
regarding the abusive history of female prostitutes, were central to the arguments 
made by those seeking the adoption and implementation of CPSS in the late 
1990s.  While critics of the proposed ban shared ideas regarding the pursuit of 
gender equality and even a gendered analysis of prostitution as a form of violence 
against women, they were critical as to whether the ban could achieve the desired 
effect.  Their concerns, however, rang hollow in the ears of CPSS proponents, 
who both stressed the symbolic function of their legislation, as well as their own 
supporting cluster of epistemic actors and expert knowedge.    
Perhaps our analysis also demonstrates that, contrary to what proponents and 
opponents alike seem to believe, the sex purchase ban as such has no inherent 
meaning. It can be justified and challenged in many diverse ways, and the ways in 
which it is justified, in turn, is likely to set the terms for its implementation and 
enforcement. On the other hand, some argue that the Swedish sex purchase ban, 
too, has adapted to a changing discursive ecology: While policymakers passed the 
law with reference to prostitution as an expression of men’s violence against 
women, it has increasingly become the solution to new, different problems as 
well, such as trans-border trafficking. As Petra Östergren argues, the sex purchase 
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ban as such is empty; “it can be filled with different, context-specific meanings, 
wishes and expectations.”128 Unsurprisingly, this is especially true when it travels 
abroad, to a different national setting such as the Norwegian, for all its similarities 
with Sweden. 
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